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Abstract. The paper analyzes dynamics of  accumulation and displacement in the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). It combines the theoretical work of  David Harvey 
and James O’Connor with a case study of  the Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited HFC-23 
destruction project in Gujarat, India. The framework is used to connect the factors driving 
opportunities for capital accumulation in the CDM market with the causes of  social and 
ecological dislocation at the local project level. We argue that the CDM is a spatial fix to 
the ecological crisis of  climate change which secures conditions of  production for fossil 
fuel industries and promotes new sites of  accumulation for other companies. The political–
economic ‘fix’ is dependent on ‘fixing’ a global sociospatial divide between developed and 
developing countries down to ‘fixed’ projects at the local level. This spatial fix facilitates a 
displacement of  the costs of  responding to the climate crisis from North to South.
Keywords: Clean Development Mechanism, carbon offset, spatial fix, CDM, climate 
crisis
Introduction
Critical researchers have analyzed the ‘new carbon economy’ according to political economic 
interests that underpin market-based mechanisms (Bailey and Wilson, 2009). Bumpus and 
Liverman (2008) and Matthews and Paterson (2005) explain the dominance of emissions 
trading and carbon offsetting schemes in international climate policy in terms of state support 
for capital accumulation. They argue that carbon markets provide opportunities for the 
accumulation of capital in the carbon trading industry and protect the profits of fossil fuel 
industries by allowing them to avoid costly emission reductions.
The socioecological outcomes of protecting and promoting capital accumulation in this 
way have also been the subject of extensive criticism. Lohmann (2010, page 238) identifies 
a disjuncture between carbon offsets as units of “climate action” and the urgent need to 
create a historical pathway away from fossil fuel dependence. Bachram (2004, page 10) 
concludes that the expropriation of Southern nature through offsetting markets constitutes 
“carbon colonialism” at the expense of the people and ecosystems affected by offsetting 
projects. Case studies collected by Lohmann (2006), Böhm and Dabhi (2009), and Ghosh and 
Sahu (2011) show that offset projects have repeatedly dispossessed communities from their 
land and polluted local environments. The result has been the entrenchment or exacerbation 
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of existing class (Vlachou and Konstantinidis, 2010), race, gender (Bond, 2007), regional 
(Corbera and Brown, 2010), and global (Böhm et al, 2012) inequalities, which would need to 
be confronted in any effective and just response to climate change.
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature on the political economy of 
carbon markets by analyzing the most extensive international carbon offsetting instrument: 
the United Nations (UN) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Together with Emissions 
Trading and Joint Implementation, the CDM is one of the three ‘flexibility mechanisms’ 
in the Kyoto Protocol. It promotes the development of carbon pollution reduction projects 
such as hydroelectric dams and industrial gas destruction factories in developing countries. 
The official purpose of the instrument is twofold: to produce carbon credits known as 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) for developed countries to use in accordance with 
their emission reduction requirements under the Kyoto Protocol and to promote ‘sustainable 
development’ in the South (UNFCCC, 1997, page 11). This paper responds to the empirical 
and theoretical agenda suggested by Bumpus and Liverman (2008) in their “accumulation 
by decarbonization” thesis by developing a theoretical framework based on the work of 
O’Connor (1998) and Harvey (1982). The framework is used to explain the socioecological 
and political economic outcomes generated in one industrial gas destruction CDM project in 
western India.
First, Bumpus and Liverman (2008, pages 148–149) suggest there is a need for “further 
theoretical work on the commodification of carbon [and] the spatial relations of emissions 
trading.” They put forward Harvey’s ‘spatial fix’ as one possible theoretical understanding of 
the CDM because “in organizing costly emission reductions through a geographic expansion 
of markets … [offsetting] … parallels other ways that capital avoids economic crises” 
(Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, page 134), but the argument is then not developed further. 
Bond (2012) also makes a limited conceptual reference to carbon offsetting as a spatial fix to 
suggest parallels between carbon offsetting and the history of waste displacement from North 
to South. In 1992, former World Bank Chief Economist Larry Summers exemplified this 
history in a leaked memo that stated Africa was “vastly under-polluted”—an economic logic 
that is replicated in the search for ‘least cost’ emissions reductions in the CDM. This paper 
deepens existing theoretical analyses of the CDM that emphasize dynamics of accumulation 
and displacement by combining Harvey’s notion of the ‘spatial fix’ and O’Connor’s 
development of Marx’s conception of the ‘conditions of production’.
Second, Bumpus and Liverman (2008, page 148) identify the need for “detailed empirical 
studies of carbon reductions in particular places and through different networks and value 
chains.” Existing empirical studies have focused on the role of different combinations of 
local communities, project developers, associated carbon trading industries, national states, 
and international agreements in shaping the outcomes of individual CDM projects (Boyd, 
2009; Bumpus, 2011; Corbera and Brown, 2010; Lansing, 2010; Yamane, 2009). However, 
they have not analyzed how CDM projects relate to global carbon markets by considering 
their particular links with fossil fuel industries in the North through the exchange of CERs. 
This paper addresses this gap with a detailed case study of the Gujarat Fluorochemicals 
Limited (GFL) HFC-23 destruction project in Gujarat, India, which connects the factors 
driving opportunities for capital accumulation in the CDM market with the causes of social 
and ecological dislocation at the project level.
The structure of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section is a theoretical discussion 
on how Harvey’s concept of the spatial fix can be used to understand the development 
and operation of the CDM by drawing on O’Connor’s understanding of ecological crisis and 
the conditions of production. The GFL case-study section documents the commodity 
networks engendered by the project involving direct project participants, financial actors 
in secondary markets, states, and polluting companies as well as its negative impacts on the 
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local environment and the health and livelihoods of local communities. The paper concludes 
by bringing together the empirical data and theoretical framework. We argue that the CDM is 
a spatial fix to the ecological crisis of climate change, which secures production conditions 
for the fossil fuel industry and promotes new sites for accumulation for other companies 
by displacing the costs of responding to the climate crisis from North to South. It also 
considers recent developments in the CDM market including the collapse of offset prices 
and new restrictions on the HFC-23 project type through the contradictions of the CDM as 
accumulation strategy (Smith, 2006).
Theorizing the CDM
Ecological crisis, conditions of production, and the spatial fix
Harvey’s (1982, page 424) ‘third cut’ at crisis theory identifies the spatial fix as a critical 
strategy used by states and capital to temporarily overcome crises of overaccumulation. 
These crises develop when the internal contradictions of capitalism undermine opportunities 
for the profitable realization of surplus value. Spatial fixes rely on “geographical expansion, 
spatial reorganization and uneven geographical development” to produce spaces and scales 
that restore conditions for capital accumulation and defer the devaluation of capital (Harvey, 
1995, page 2). However, spatial fixes often amount to a displacement of crisis due to both 
the immediate social dislocation caused by the initial reconfiguration and the inevitable 
reproduction of the same crisis tendencies (Harvey, 2003, page 117).
O’Connor (1998) extends the Marxist theory of overaccumulation crisis arising from the 
‘first contradiction’ between capital and labor to ecological concerns. The formulation begins 
with the contention that capitalism has a tendency to materially degrade or ‘underproduce’ 
its natural (and spatial and personal) conditions of production which are not wholly produced 
by capital and therefore secured by the state (O’Connor, 1998, pages 164–167). This 
‘second contradiction’ between capital and nature creates the possibility of the formation of 
ecological crises. Such crises manifest as economic costs to capital and capitalist states if the 
use values of nature are sufficiently impaired and/or social contestation over degradation of 
nature is sufficiently strong to create a barrier to accumulation (O’Connor, 1998, page 242; 
Rosewarne, 1997, page 112).
Like Harvey, O’Connor (1998, pages 167–168) identifies a number of strategies that 
states and capital have developed in order to temporarily resolve ecological crises including 
technological fixes and environmental regulation. Of particular interest to the analysis of the 
CDM as a spatial fix is O’Connor’s (1998, page 167) contention that these strategies attempt 
to “restructure production conditions with the aim of raising profits”, which implies a spatial 
element to crisis-induced changes in social relations with nature (emphasis added). Harvey’s 
spatial fix could therefore provide a useful way of addressing O’Connor’s underdevelopment 
of the relationship between nature and space as conditions of production.
However, O’Connor’s theory has been criticized for having a dualist ontological basis 
that posits a separation between capital and nature. Indeed, Harvey (1996, pages 146–147) 
has placed O’Connor’s work within a Marxist reversion to “ecoscarcity and natural limits” 
analysis which treats nature as an “axiomatic limiting condition of human existence.” 
Harvey’s (1982, chapters 12 and 13) emphasis on the reconfiguration of built environments 
in spatial fixes demonstrates that the production of nature is central to his understanding 
of economic crisis. Conversely, O’Connor’s thesis is organized in terms of an “epic” clash 
between the separate economic and ecological spheres of capitalism and the environment 
(Castree, 2002, pages 124–125).
Despite the dualistic presentation, O’Connor’s (1998, chapter 7) development of Marx’s 
conception of the conditions of production as productive forces and social relations of 
production reveals an ontology of nature that is substantively compatible with Harvey’s. 
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As social relations, natural conditions are “produced and reproduced (or made accessible) 
within definite property, legal and social relationships” (O’Connor, 1998, page 148). 
Through this lens, the widespread introduction of fossil fuel combustion as a productive 
force in 19th-century industry was necessitated by capitalist social relations impelling labor 
productivity improvements and the creation of a flexible and disposable workforce (Huber, 
2009). The resulting (second) contradiction between capital and the climate system, which 
like fossil fuel is also a condition of production, is therefore a product of a historically 
specific manifestation of the (first) contradiction where capital has replaced labor power 
with greenhouse gas emissions. In this way, ecological crises, such as climate change, are 
a “specifically capitalist scarcity … whereby capital creates its own barrier (or limit?)” 
(O’Connor, 1998, page 159).
The question mark on the nature of challenge posed by ecological crisis to capital reflects 
uncertainty over whether it will result in barriers to accumulation or opportunities for profit. 
The answer is always mediated by political contestation over the social regulation of nature 
between capital, social movements, and the state (O’Connor, 1998, page 165). O’Connor’s 
focus on the concrete political economic factors shaping the course of ecological crises 
provides the framework needed to apply the concept of spatial fix, which Harvey originally 
developed in relation to overaccumulation crises, to climate politics and the CDM.
The CDM as spatial ‘fix’
The CDM can be understood as a spatial fix to the ecological crisis of climate change 
by considering both meanings of ‘fix’ identified by Harvey. The first is the metaphorical 
meaning of ‘a fix’ as a temporary resolution, and the second is the material idea of spatial 
‘fixity’ (Harvey, 2003, page 115). In the metaphorical sense the CDM is a spatial ‘fix’ 
for capital to avoid the potential costs of climate policy. The disruption of the climate 
system—a condition of production in the form of a carbon sink—will raise costs for many 
forms of capitalist production and cause social dislocation (Stern, 2007). In the short term, 
though, most potential costs to business from climate change come in responses to these 
material impacts in the form of social regulation of the climate. This is because stringent 
and enforced restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions could politically deprive fossil-fuel-
dependent capital of the energy source that Malm (2013, page 51) describes as “the general 
lever for surplus-value production”. The fix which secured continued access to fossil fuels 
and carbon sinks as conditions of production for Northern capital was the product of the 
institutionalization of international political contestation between states, capital, and social 
movements at UN climate negotiations.
At the time of the Kyoto climate conference in 1997 the political position of Northern 
corporations with varying economic interests in fossil fuels and climate policy was mixed. 
They ranged from outright opposition to mandatory action from the Global Climate Coalition 
representing fossil fuel interests, to calls for ‘flexibility’ from the International Climate Change 
Partnership representing mainly manufacturers, to support for green technology opportunities 
from the Business Council for Sustainable Energy (Levy and Egan, 1998, page 346). The 
demands of climate movements were similarly variegated. However, the larger environmental 
NGOs from both North and South were brought together under the umbrella of the Climate 
Action Network (CAN), which called for binding and domestic reductions of 20% by 2005 
for developed countries and opposed emissions trading (Betsill, 2002, page 53). The Kyoto 
Protocol included elements of each of these positions. The 5% overall emission reduction cap 
from 1990 levels by 2012 was binding but of a lower magnitude and slower timetable than 
demanded by CAN. The US government subsequently adopted the ‘do nothing’ approach 
exemplified by the Global Climate Coalition by not ratifying the agreement but not before 
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securing the inclusion of the CDM as a ‘flexibility mechanism’ for achieving the Kyoto 
targets (Grubb et al, 1999, pages 102–103).
The CDM provides flexibility for capital by restructuring the geographical management 
of greenhouse gas emissions and carbon sinks. It builds on the general sociospatial divide 
between developed and developing countries at UN climate conferences—codified as 
Annex I and non-Annex I countries to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change—to create an external space in the South where carbon sink capacity can be 
produced and an internal space in the North where carbon sink capacity can be consumed. 
Like spatial fixes to crises of overaccumulation that use external territories to overcome 
immediate social constraints, the CDM allows Northern capital to draw on abstract carbon 
sink capacity produced in developing countries to offset their continued use of material 
carbon sinks as conditions of production. Similarly, the fix also aims to support profit rates by 
protecting fossil fuel industries against costly emission reductions and promoting economic 
opportunities for a range of financial, green technology, and other industries involved in the 
production and trading of abstract carbon sinks as CERs.
The ‘fixity’ component of the spatial fix refers to tensions between the need to 
geographically ‘fix’ spatial configurations and physical infrastructure and the drag of this 
produced space and nature on the mobility of capital in future spatial fixes (Harvey, 2001, 
page 25; see also Brenner, 1998; Smith, 2008). The spatial fix for Northern capital is thus 
dependent on the differentiation of global space into ‘fixed’ internal and external spaces. 
This requirement for spatial fixity goes down to the local level of material and often large-
scale projects ‘fixed’ in particular places in the South, which ‘reduce’ emissions instead of 
Northern corporations with similarly immobile fossil fuel infrastructure.
Fixing projects in places that have made a smaller contribution to historical greenhouse 
gas emissions than the North is justified by the reductionist idea that it is immaterial 
where, how, and by whom a tonne of carbon is emitted (Lohmann, 2012). Carbon trading 
overcomes this tension by abstracting from the social dimensions of climate change using 
the singular measure of the quantity of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted or reduced from 
a socially constructed future scenario to calculate the production of carbon sinks. Abstract 
CERs spatially integrate the factories, mines, and farms registered as CDM projects with 
Northern governments that have Kyoto obligations and EU Emissions Trading System 
(ETS) installations. The geographical space between producers and consumers of carbon 
sink capacity also becomes a condition of production for the many carbon market service 
providers that facilitate CER commodity networks. The following section analyses and 
unpacks the socioecological relations engendered by the spatial fix through a case study of 
one project: the GFL HFC-23 destruction plant in Gujarat, India.
Case study: HFC-23 destruction in Gujarat, India
The GFL HFC-23 destruction project became the first CDM project when the CDM Executive 
Board registered it in 2005. Based in the Indian state of Gujarat, the factory’s primary activity 
prior to involvement in the CDM was the production of the refrigerant gas HCFC-22 (GFL, 
2003, page 14). The production of HCFC-22 results in the creation of the HFC-23 byproduct 
which has been designated with a global warming potential of 11 700 by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, meaning 1 tonne of HFC-23 gas makes the equivalent contribution 
to global warming over 100 years as 11 700 tons of carbon dioxide (IPCC, 2007, page 212). 
The company ‘reduces’ greenhouse gas emissions and therefore produces CER offsets by 
destroying HFC-23 with thermal oxidation technology (GFL, 2003, page 8). The high global 
warming potential of HFC-23 has enabled the GFL project to produce a disproportionately 
large quantity of CERs. As of 1 December 2014 the single project had been issued with 
55.87 million CERs, representing 4% of the total 1 billion-plus CERs issued to the 7579 
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registered projects globally and 28% of CERs issued to India’s 1535 registered projects 
(UNEP DTU, 2013).
Evidence of “gaming and abuse” of CDM rules by GFL’s project developers and many of 
the other twenty-one registered HFC destruction projects, which had produced 35% of all 
CERs issued in the CDM by 1 December 2014, led the European Commission to ban all CERs 
from HFC-23 projects in the EU ETS from 2013 (Carbon Market Watch, 2010; European 
Commission, 2011; UNEP DTU, 2013). The GFL project has also come under prior media, 
activist, and academic scrutiny for its poor local record (Centre for Science and Environment, 
2005a; Counter Review, 2013; Dabhi, 2009; Ghouri, 2009; Lohmann, 2006; Rosenthal, 
2012; Rosenthal and Lehren, 2012; Sutter and Parreño, 2007). The large quantity of offsets 
produced by the GFL project and its widely documented local impacts provide significant 
empirical scope to examine the relationship between the accumulation opportunities along 
CER commodity networks and the socioecological impacts documented in this and many 
other offsetting projects (Böhm and Dabhi, 2009; Ghosh and Sahu, 2011; Lohmann, 2006).
The analysis in the case study is progressed using a range of primary and secondary 
qualitative and quantitative evidence. Documents from the UN and company reports show 
that the project has created highly profitable commodity networks for GFL and other CDM 
market actors. Publicly available EU ETS compliance data show that the project has also 
provided a successful political–economic fix for Northern capital. Fossil-fuel-intensive 
corporations have surrendered a considerable quantity of CERs produced by GFL under the 
EU ETS to cover excess carbon pollution and have used the credits for ‘green’ marketing 
purposes. However, our observations from field visits to the GFL site and surrounding villages 
and interviews with the people who live in them, as well as with GFL workers and activists 
from a Gujarati NGO, indicate the project is linked to the pollution of the environment and 
has damaged the health and livelihoods of the local community.(1) The interviews were 
informal and nonrecorded due to the social and political volatility that surrounds the project 
but supported by media reports and government documents.
Social and ecological dislocation
The GFL plant is located in Ranjitnagar village, part of Ghoghamba Taluka in the Panchmahal 
District of the state of Gujarat. In total, 18 273 people live in 3253 households in ten poor 
and rural villages within about 6 km of the project (Government of India, 2011a).(2) 2011 
Indian Census information reveals that 75% of the working population in these villages 
are engaged in agriculture (Government of India, 2011a; 2011b). The majority of these are 
‘cultivators’, meaning they farm their own privately or collectively owned land, rather than 
being employed as ‘agricultural laborers’. The proportion of cultivators is higher than the 
rural average for India and indicates the importance of access to decent quality land for these 
communities’ livelihoods (Government of India, 2011a; 2011b). There is also a very high 
proportion of people from the historically disadvantaged Scheduled Tribe groups at 56% 
compared with a national average of 11% in rural areas (Government of India, 2011a; 2011b). 
The low literacy rate of 52% (the rural average for India is 68%) is a useful proxy for the 
low human development in the villages, which have inadequate public education, health, and 
sanitation infrastructure (Government of India, 2011a; 2011b).
GFL has had a history of conflict with the local communities since the plant opened in 
1989 (Rosenthal, 2012). The production of HCFC-22 is a prerequisite for the destruction 
of HFC-23 and therefore cannot be separated from the impacts of the CDM project. 
(1) Dates of fieldwork were 22 March–15 April 2008 and 7–10 April 2010. Data collected were 
consistent across both stages.
(2) Virapura, Dudhapura, Rinchhiya, Rayan Mavuda, Chelavada, Nathkuva, Kankodakoi, Jitpura, 
Chadranagar. Interviews were conducted in the latter four and Ranjitnagar.
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Its production is a polluting and potentially toxic activity in its own right when its hazardous 
feed stocks (such as chloroform and sulfuric acid) and wastes are not treated and disposed 
of properly (GFL, 2003; US Environmental Protection Agency, 2000). HCFC-22 is also 
a potent greenhouse gas with a global warming potential of 1500 and an ozone-depleting 
substance listed for phase-out under the Montreal Protocol (IPCC, 2007, page 212). In 1996 
community members were assisted by the Gujarati environmental organization Paryavaran 
Mitra in taking GFL to the Gujarat High Court over air and water pollution that they alleged 
was caused by the dumping of hazardous wastes.(3) The court action was unsuccessful but 
local activists have continued to oppose the plant. For example, in 2005 an explosion in a 
tanker at the plant caused an oleum (sulfuric acid) leak, which local community members 
claim resulted in fifty hospital admissions (NDTV, 2006). In response, a protest at the GFL 
site resulted in eighty-four arrests (Ghouri, 2009; Rosenthal, 2012). Community members we 
interviewed informed us that twenty were detained for over a month and some were issued 
with court orders that exclude them from areas close to the GFL plant.
This social and ecological dislocation has been maintained and in some ways exacerbated 
by the addition of CDM project activities. GFL destroys HFC-23 by capturing rather than 
venting the gas and incinerating it at high temperatures in a thermal oxidation chamber (GFL, 
2003, page 8). The goal of the process is to convert HFC-23 into carbon dioxide and water. 
However, the GFL project design document (PDD) lists numerous other substances that are 
used in, or are byproducts, of the incineration that are potentially hazardous to humans and/or 
the environment (US Department of Labor, 2014). The PDD states the thermal incineration 
process creates hydrochloric acid and hydrogen fluoride, results in the release of carbon 
monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrous oxide, and uses caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) and 
hydrated lime (calcium hydroxide) (GFL, 2003, page 9). It also produces greenhouse gas 
emissions through the combustion of liquefied petroleum gas at the site and the purchase 
of fossil-fuel-powered electricity from the grid (GFL, 2003, page 9). The PDD states these 
chemicals are recycled, recovered, or treated through venting, scrubbing, and cooling (GFL, 
2003, pages 19–21). However, activists we interviewed from Paryavaran Mitra claim that 
GFL’s history of discharging chemicals into the air, water, and land around the plant has 
continued with the CDM project activities.
Results of tests of groundwater in the local area by the Department of Drinking Water 
Supply are consistent with pollution created by the production of HCFC-22 and the destruction 
of HFC-23. Wells in Ranjitnagar and five of the nine villages surrounding the GFL plant 
recorded fluoride concentrations classified as “above permissible levels” at up to 7.97 mg/l 
in tests carried out between April 2009 and April 2011 (Government of India, 2011c).(4) At 
low levels fluoride can have positive impacts for dental health, but drinking water containing 
over 3 mg/l of fluoride can cause skeletal fluorosis (World Health Organization, 2004, 
page 5). The villages of Ranjitnagar and Nathvuka also recorded “above permissible levels” 
of chloride at up to 1344 mg/l and 4424 mg/l in tests carried out on 9 March 2011 and 6 May 
2009, respectively (Government of India, 2011c). Chloride toxicity can occur in crops when 
chloride concentrations exceed tolerance levels, causing burning and drying of leaves (Food 
and Agriculture Organization, 1985). The presence of chloride in water is not harmful to 
human health, but is an indicator for industrial waste (World Health Organization, 2003, 
page 2).
(3) Andarsingh Mangalsingh Parmar and Udaisingh Mohanbhai Baria vs Gujarat Fluorochemicals 
Limited, State of Gujarat, The Chairman Gujarat Pollution Control Board, The Chairman Gujarat 
Industrial Development Corporation and The Chairman Gujarat Electricity Board (Special Civil 
Application No. 5280 of 1995).
(4) Water samples from Jitpura, Virapura, Dudhapura, Rinchhiya, and Rayan Mavuda.
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Problems with human health and agricultural production in the villages surrounding the 
project are consistent with the impacts of the pollutants present in the water supply that are 
involved in GFL’s original and CDM activities: oily films on the water and white crusts on 
the soil that can be observed in the vicinity of the project (see also Ghouri, 2009). As a result 
of this pollution, local farmers we interviewed claimed to have suffered from a reduction in 
the productivity, quality, and absolute yields of corn, cotton, and rice in recent years. They 
said mango and papaya had also become particularly prone to rapid decay (see also NDTV, 
2006). Local community members told us that they were suffering from endemic eye and 
skin conditions such as skin pigmentation disorders, rashes and eye irritation, joint pains, 
and decreased fertility (see also Rosenthal, 2012). People we interviewed strongly asserted 
that pollution released from the GFL plant was to blame for these problems.
The negative impacts of the GFL project on the local community have not been offset by 
the benefits promised by the project developers in the PDD, despite some local community 
members reporting that local air quality had improved following the reduction in HFC-23 
venting. The PDD promised employment for thirty to forty mostly unskilled workers in the 
operation of the HFC-23 destruction plant (GFL, 2003, page 57). However, local community 
members and GFL workers told us that many of the additional jobs had bypassed the local 
community in favor of lower paid workers from the northern states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. 
The company’s promise to spend 70 million Indian rupees (US $1.13 million) on ‘sustainable 
development’ over the course of the project has also not materialized (GFL, 2003, page 83).(5) 
Local farmers told us that GFL had been supplying them with two bags of urea and one 
bag of diammonium phosphate fertilizer each monsoon. However, it requires continually 
increasing quantities and has been prone to steep price rises, exposing farmers to a potentially 
unsustainable situation once the GFL project ceases (Mukherjee, 2011). Community members 
told us that, rather than engaging with them on community development initiatives, GFL has 
employed a strategy of offering money to individual protest leaders in return for silence. 
Almost halfway through the ten-year project crediting period we found no evidence for any 
of the other promises made in the PDD, such as improved sanitation services, being fulfilled 
by the company (GFL, 2003, page 83).
Protecting fossil fuel industries and promoting accumulation
The economic benefits from the GFL project for actors other than the local community can be 
documented throughout the various CER commodity networks engendered by destruction of 
HFC-23. GFL, the project developer and owner of the plant, has been the primary financial 
beneficiary of the project. Revenue from the sale of CERs following CDM registration has 
significantly increased the profitability of GFL.(6) Multiple annual reports following CDM 
registration state “the sale of carbon credits to European buyers has added a healthy revenue 
stream to your company’s operating results” (eg, GFL, 2006, page 6). GFL increased its total 
profit by 150% in 2006/07, its first year of CDM trading, by selling 3.9 billion Indian rupees 
(US $62.97 million) worth of CERs. Revenue from CER sales went from zero prior to CDM 
project status to an average of 46% of total sales between 2006/07 and 2012/13, which more 
than supplemented revenue from the production of refrigerant gases and demonstrated the 
effective integration of CER and other forms of commodity production (see table 1). Figures 
in the company’s annual reports, reproduced in table 1 and figure 1, show that revenue 
remained steady or increased in the years until 2010/11 when global carbon prices dropped. 
Perversely, revenue and profits increased in 2011/12 following the decision by the European 
(5) All exchange rates from http://www.xe.com and accurate 1 December 2014, with US $1 = Rs. 
61.93 = €80.08.
(6) A small proportion of GFL revenue (from the issuance and sale of 100 000 CERs) derives from two 
other wind farm CDM projects operated by GFL in the states of Rajasthan and Maharashtra.
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Commission to ban HFC-23 CERs in the EU ETS from 2013, corresponding with a general 
trend of European companies rushing to surrender CERs from industrial gas projects while 
they still could (BusinessGreen, 2012). However, the decision led to a fall in carbon credit 
revenue to just $0.1 million in 2013/14.
The profitability of GFL’s CDM operations can be attributed to low initial capital and 
operating costs compared with average 2012 CER futures prices of €10.90 (US $13.61) 
during the second phase of the EU ETS between 2008 and 2012 (Intercontinental 
Exchange, 2014). The total investment in thermal oxidation technology was estimated at 
Table 1. Nominal Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited financial results, 2002–13 (GFL, 2014).
Financial 
year
Revenue from CER  
sales (US $ million)
Total sales income 
(US $ million)
CER as % of total 
sales income
Profit after taxation 
(US $ million)
2002/03 0.0 22.3 0.0 6.2
2003/04 0.0 25.3 0.0 9.5
2004/05 0.0 28.7 0.0 8.1
2005/06 0.0 30.3 0.0 17.7
2006/07 63.0 94.0 67.0 44.5
2007/08 73.3 119.9 61.1 58.9
2008/09 101.6 173.0 58.7 62.7
2009/10 76.4 162.5 47.0 61.5
2010/11 32.7 164.3 19.9 47.9
2011/12 141.5 343.6 41.2 138.9
2012/13 71.3 270.8 26.3 73.4
2013/14 0.1 197.0 0.05 13.7
Note. CER—Certified Emission Reduction.
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Figure 1. Nominal Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited financial results, 2002–13 (GFL, 2014).
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only 130 million Indian rupees (US $2.1 million) and the process of destroying HFC-23 
is estimated at costing only US $0.50 per tonne of carbon dioxide-equivalent (Centre for 
Science and Environment, 2005b; Schwank, 2004). GFL has reinvested its profits from the 
sale of CERs to expand its chemicals businesses through the commissioning and construction 
of new caustic soda/chlorine, chloromethane, and polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE, commonly 
known as Teflon) plants and internal electricity generation capacity as well as to other 
industries including renewable energy and cinemas through its subsidiaries Inox Wind and 
Inox Leisure. It was reported to have leveraged CER revenues to finance a capital expenditure 
program in these areas that would increase its asset base by five-fold (CRISIL, 2013; Money 
Times 2014). Figure 1 shows that, while these investments contributed to revenues from 
GFL’s chemicals business remaining relatively strong following the end of the CER business, 
profit levels were not sustained.
In addition to GFL, there are a number of project participants, primarily based in the 
Global North, that have gained financially from their direct involvement in the GFL project. 
The technology used to destroy HFC-23 was supplied by UK company Ineos Fluor Limited, 
which received a portion of the CERs produced in return (GFL, 2003, page 11). Between 2008 
and 2012 three installations based in the UK, Germany, and Norway,(7) owned by chemicals 
manufacturer Ineos Group, which owned Ineos Fluor until 2010, surrendered 45 249 CERs 
produced by GFL for compliance purposes under the EU ETS (European Commission, 2013).(8) 
Sumitomo Corporation received another portion of GFL CERs in return for maintenance 
carried out by Daikin Industries on the plant (GFL, 2003, page 12). The Japanese company 
justified its role in GFL and other CDM projects as being designed to meet Japan’s Kyoto 
Protocol targets and has used GFL CERs to market air conditioner filters as “carbon neutral” 
(Sumitomo Corporation, 2005, page 29; 2010). Three private consultancy firms have provided 
fee-based services to the project including the Mumbai office of PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
which prepared the PDD; SGS United Kingdom, which validated the project; and DNV Climate 
Services Denmark, which verified the emission reductions (GFL, 2003, page 1; UNEP DTU, 
2014). The Government of India approved the project as meeting its sustainable development 
guidelines and has gained additional taxation revenue from GFL by subjecting CER sales to a 
30% corporate tax rate (BS Reporter, 2010). Dutch banking corporation Rabobank has acted 
as a mediator between GFL and the Government of the Netherlands in the purchase of CERs 
in line with the latter’s Kyoto obligations (GFL, 2003, page 12).
Beyond the immediate project participants the CERs produced by the GFL have benefited 
other financial institutions that trade in secondary carbon markets (figure 2). For example, 
the London office of carbon broker Natsource Tullett brokered a deal for Ineos Fluor to sell 
two million CERs from GFL to an ‘undisclosed’ European corporation over six years from 
2006 (Ineos, 2004). Carbon investor Noble Carbon Credits—a subsidiary of global energy, 
agriculture, and industrial conglomerate Noble Group—purchased GFL CERs to form part 
of its claimed 15% market share in CERs (Kalesh, 2006; Noble Group, 2013; UNEP DTU, 
2014). Carbon traders like Noble Carbon Credits and Natsource Tullett can profit from these 
over-the-counter trades by taking advantage of the changing price differentials between 
EU ETS allowances and CERs. CERs are also traded on exchanges like European Climate 
Exchange and are used to create financial instruments such as futures, options, and other 
derivatives (Ellerman et al, 2010, pages 139–146). As a large producer of CERs globally, 
the GFL project has made a significant contribution to the formation and operation of these 
financial markets.
(7) Installation names: INEOS Norge AS (Norway), Ammoniakanlage—Hilfskessel O6 (Germany), 
and Grangemouth Chemicals (UK).
(8) All installation ownership data from Carbon Market Data (2014) and defined as a greater than 
50% + 1 stake.
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Many large energy companies have also set up their own carbon trading offices. For 
example, Électricité de France (EDF), the state-owned corporatized French energy giant, 
set up a €290 million carbon fund through EDF Trading, which develops projects and trades 
CERs with EDF subsidiaries and third parties (EDF Trading, 2013). Installations owned by 
EDF surrendered 462 476 CERs produced by GFL between 2008 and 2012 with almost half 
by its UK energy utilities (European Commission, 2013). EDF has also used the trading 
and purchase of CERs to cultivate a ‘green’ marketing image for competitive advantage in 
the UK energy market. EDF Group’s (2009, page 72) Activity and Sustainable Development 
Report states that the purchase of CERs from India forms part of its “commitment to energy 
eco-efficiency” which aligns with EDF Energy’s (UK) green marketing campaign that saw it 
sponsor the 2012 London Olympics as “official sustainability partner” (EDF Energy, 2013).
Most importantly, the primary use value of CERs for the fossil fuel industry is their 
compliance value under the EU ETS. Between 2008 and 2012, 1120 installations (about 8% 
of total EU ETS installations) surrendered 47.02 million GFL CERs (European Commission, 
2013). This accounted for 7% of the total 675.39 million CERs surrendered by EU ETS 
installations from all CDM projects in this period (European Commission, 2013). Therefore, 
the CDM, and the GFL project in particular, has enabled Northern companies to emit millions 
of tonnes more carbon dioxide than they otherwise would have been able to. Surrendered 
GFL credits have been concentrated in a few large installations and companies, with the 
top-ten installations surrendering 11.64 million CERs (European Commission, 2013). They 
include coal-fired power plants, such as the Eggborough Power Station in East Yorkshire, 
UK, which on average exceeded its allocated allowances by 41.24% in the second phase of 
the EU ETS and surrendered 794 218 GFL CERs to help meet the shortfall (Carbon Market 
Data, 2014; European Commission, 2013).
Figure 2. Gujarat Fluorochemicals Limited (GFL) Certified Emission Reductions commodity 
network. Note. ECX—European Climate Exchange; EDF—Électricité de France; EU ETS—EU 
Emissions Trading System.
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However, not all CERs surrendered for compliance in the EU ETS were necessary 
for installations to emit overallocated caps. Integriertes Hüttenwerk Duisburg, a steel 
manufacturing installation in Duisburg, Germany, that is part-owned by ThyssenKrupp and 
which also manages their trading account, surrendered the largest quantity of GFL credits 
at 3.12 million CERs (European Commission, 2013). At both the installation and company 
level, free allocation exceeded verified emissions, leading to a substantial surplus of 
European permits (Carbon Market Data, 2014; European Commission, 2014). The option 
of surrendering CERs for Integriertes Hüttenwerk Duisburg’s excess emissions would have 
allowed ThyssenKrupp to bank its surplus European permits or take advantage of their higher 
price than CERs by freeing them up to sell.
Discussion and conclusions
Through the GFL case study the CDM can be understood as a spatial fix in a variety of 
ways. First, the CDM allows Northern states, such as Japan and the Netherlands, to meet 
their Kyoto targets by exporting their emission reduction efforts to the South, minimizing 
the need to fundamentally restructure their own fossil-fuel-dependent economies. Second, 
purchasing CERs enables publicly and privately owned companies with emissions reduction 
requirements under the EU ETS, like Ineos and Eggborough Power, to meet their targets 
without paying higher costs associated with reducing pollution from their own production 
activities and thereby maintaining their own rates of accumulation. In both cases states have 
secured ongoing access for these actors to material carbon sinks, and therefore fossil fuels, 
as conditions of production.
Third, the availability of cheap CERs through the CDM allows polluting companies in the 
North, including Sumitomo and EDF, to market themselves in ‘green’ ways, quite separate 
from their direct social relations with nature. Fourth, the economic activity generated by the 
production of CERs provides project participants and other CDM actors without emission 
reduction requirements, including project developers such as GFL and carbon brokers and 
consultants like Natsource Tullet, with a new source of profits derived through the climate 
crisis. Both are examples of the economic benefits of securing carbon sinks as conditions of 
production in abstract form through their commodification.
Each political–economic fix is inextricably linked to materially fixed CDM projects by 
the mechanism of carbon trading, which integrates internal and external spaces of Global 
North and South fixed at UN climate negotiations. The carbon market enables the costs 
of responding to the climate crisis to be displaced from (also fixed) polluting industries in 
the North to communities in the South. The negative impacts of displacement at the local 
level are caused by a conflict between the accumulation imperatives driving the political 
economic fix and the needs of the communities and environments surrounding fixed projects 
in the South. Substituting emission reductions in the North for the destruction of HFC-23 
necessarily appropriates land, water, and ecological systems at the local level. Indeed, the 
production of carbon credits in this way both depends on, and financially supports, polluting 
HCFC-22 production. However, the conditions of production for CDM project developers 
are also “conditions of human life” for local communities that require and manage healthy 
ecosystems, clean water, and access to land to sustain their livelihoods (O’Connor, 1998, 
page 155).
The conditions of life around CDM projects are not valued through CDM verification 
processes or EU ETS and Kyoto compliance requirements. Indeed, the displacement of the 
costs of CER production to these local conditions increases the profitability of participation 
in the CDM market for project developers and Northern polluters. All CDM projects, whether 
coal-bed methane or hydropower, are materially dependent on local conditions of production 
and therefore have the potential to negatively impact local communities and ecosystems 
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in the course of maximizing profits. Space is therefore fixed and global and local scales 
reconfigured in the interests of the four political–economic fixes outlined above rather than 
the interests of communities affected by CDM projects.
Voluntary schemes, such as the CDM Gold Standard, have attempted to value the 
conditions of life around CDM projects and have been profitable for a limited number of 
CDM market actors (Dhanda and Hartman, 2011). For example, the consultancy firms which 
verify the additional social and environmental standards benefit from increased business, 
project developers receive a premium price for their offsets, and the polluting companies 
that purchase them gain additional marketing benefits beyond simple compliance (Paterson, 
2010, page 361). But these profits are dependent on differentiation from a main CDM market 
with less stringent regulations. Enforcement of such standards for all projects would act 
as drag on the overall accumulation rationale of the CDM by raising costs for all project 
developers and/or polluters while eliminating the financial benefits of ecolabelled offsets 
as they are currently designed. Climate policy is riddled with contradictory interests over 
fundamental issues such as emissions caps. However, the accumulation imperatives for both 
old fossil-fuel-intensive and new for-profit CDM market actors line up with the relatively 
cheap production of CERs, which is supported by weak social and environmental regulation 
of projects at the local level (Paton and Bryant, 2012). For example, in the GFL case a greater 
distribution of CER revenue to local communities or enhanced pollution controls would have 
either reduced the profit margins for GFL or, if passed on, increased compliance costs for the 
polluting industries in the North.
This suggests there are significant political–economic limitations to the potential to reform 
the sustainable development governance of the CDM without challenging the rationale of the 
instrument itself (see Paulsson, 2009; Sutter and Parreño, 2007). Nonetheless, the campaign 
directed towards the European Commission to ban HFC-23 offsets from the CDM was a 
major success (Carbon Market Watch, 2014). The ban means CERs produced by GFL will no 
longer provide a ‘fix’ for European companies, and GFL (2012, page 12) has acknowledged 
its profits from the CDM will dry up. Nevertheless, the analysis of the commodity networks 
presented in this paper remains relevant for other project types that are still producing offsets 
because eligible CERs are homogenous commodities when traded in carbon markets. Hence, 
we expect similar dynamics and patterns can be observed in other CDM and voluntary offset 
projects (Lohmann, 2012).
However, Harvey’s (1982, page 442) contention that “there is, in short, no ‘spatial fix’ that 
can contain the contradictions of capitalism in the long run” appears to be already playing out 
due to the all-too-visible contradictions within the accumulation rationale of the CDM. CER 
prices have hovered around and below €1 since 2013 due to the large surplus of European 
and offset permits in the EU ETS, which is projected to reach 3.1 billion credits by 2020 as 
a result of overallocation, economic crisis, and the flooding of CERs into the market relative 
to demand (Morris, 2012). The reluctance of EU institutions to go beyond minor reforms to 
increase the demand for and the price of CERs by drastically decreasing emissions caps 
and permanently withdrawing a substantial quantity of EU permits has erased many profit-
making opportunities in the CDM market (Lang, 2014). Financial institutions in the City of 
London have been radically scaling back their carbon trading operations and proposals for 
new CDM projects from project developers have dried up, demonstrating that the current 
configuration of the spatial fix is not working for these actors (Pickard and Makan, 2013; 
UNEP DTU, 2014).
The overproduction of CERs in this context is a symptom of states prioritizing parts 
of the political–economic fix aimed at securing cheap emission reductions for polluting 
companies in the North. The political priority given to fossil-fuel-dependent capital has been 
at the expense of the economic interests of carbon trading industries that generally benefit 
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from higher carbon prices, notwithstanding the potential for financial actors to profit from 
market volatility at any price. This suggests that there may also be political–economic limits 
for states in the implementation of carbon trading as an accumulation strategy for both fossil 
fuel and ‘green’ industries.
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